MATHEMATICS AND THE PHYSICAL WORLD: A RECONSIDERATION
Nc)rm311 DE SILVA T HE PRINCIPAL purpose of this article is to suggest two things: first, tint a widely held interpretation of the fathers of the scientifîc revolutîon is dubious: and second, that this same interpretation can best be replaced by another whieh harmonizes more wîth what these and other physieists do in faet say.
The interpretation in question arises when asking why a mathematical approach to nature is not only successful, but even possible, and it consists in maintaining that according to the majority opinion of the physicists themselves, nature is "essentially" or "fundamentally" mathematical. Thus E.A. Burtt, in his now classic Metaphysicaf Foundations of Modern Science, summarizes what he believes to be the position of post-Renaissance scientists with these words:
Wc have observed that the heart of the new scientific metaphysics is to be found in the aseription of ultimatc rcality and causal efficacy to the world of mathematics, which world is identified with the realm of material bodies moving in space and time. Expressed somewhat more fully ... the real world in which man lives is no longer regarded as a world of substances possessed of as many ultimate qualities as can be experienced in them, but has become a world of atoms (now electrons), equipped with none but mathematical characteristics, and moving according to laws fully statable in mathematical form. l Alexander Koyré follows suit when he writes, "Elle (modern science at its inception) choisit la précision comme principe; elle affirme que \e réel est géomé-trique par essence et soumis, par conséquent, à la détermination ct à la mesure rigoureuses ... "2 And A.C. Crombie maintains, "The momentous change that Gali\eo, along with other platonizing mathematicians like Kepler, introduced into scientific ontology was to identify the substance of the real world with the mathematieal entities contained in the theories used to describe the 'appearances' ".3 l. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1964: p. 300. Now if this position supposedly propounded by the physicists is true, then the successes of a purely mathematical physics are easily explicable; yet certain further consequences accrue that are quite disconcerting. For one, any investigation of nature employing non-mathematical tools or concepts is sim ply barking up a wrong tree. The biological sciences, psychology, etc., are all superfluous entcrprises lO the degree that they eschew considerations of the mathematical aspects of their subjects; and the little they can contribute to lcarning is restricted to discoveries concerning certain épiphenomena, the knowledge of whieh is hardly worth the effort. Secondly, and allied to the first, the natural thing that is man becomcs largely inexplicable. The thoughts and aspirations that characterize him are seemingly barred from mathematical analysis, and hence ipso facto subjective, or unreal. Ironically enough, the scope of mathematical physics would preclude consideration of the very being responsible for that science to begin with.
"Une Expérience de mesure", in
These consequences, being grave, force us to re-examine the conclusions of the aforementioned historians. Do ail of the renowned physicists, or even a majority, maintain that nature is in essence mathematical? Is this the most faithful manner of understanding the "heart of the new scientific metaphysics" ') The central thesis of what follows is that it is not. The statements of Kepler, Galileo and others need not be read as Burtt has insisted, for there exists another interpretation far more in keeping with what they actually do say. This second interpretation, we hope to show, is more characteristic of scientists than the first, as witness a close examination of the key passages of their works. Moreover, certain modifications of what we consider to be the actual position of these seminal thinkers will be presented, as made by several physicists of this century. These modifications, we suggest, render the position very much akin to an outlook proposed by a number of physicists as far back as Aristotle, which outlook indeed provides a basis for a mathematical approach to nature, yet without the adverse consequences above enumerated. These being our c1aims, four things are required to substantiate them. First, a brief criticism of Burtt's interpretation must be adduced! followed by a summary of our own; thirdly, representative texts from 20 lh century scientists will be taken in relation to the views of their predecessors, manifesting to what extent they agree and disagree with what we consider Newton, Galileo, Kepler, etc., to be actually saying; lastly, we will attempt to link the position of the current scientists to a tradition beginning with Aristotle -a tie that would emphasize ail the more strongly that we need not adhere to any mathematization of nature to explain the possibility and successes of a mathcmatical physics.
* * *
To begin with, it is not Burtt's allegation that al] physicists considered nature to be in essence mathematical. He is careful to expose the "non-mathematical current", represented by thinkers such as Gilbert and, to a certain extent, such men as Boyle and Harvey,' These, though, were not responsible for the "scientific revolution", nor for the supposed world view consequent upon that upheaval. Others are held accountable for this, most notably Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Hobbes and Newton. According to Burlt, the mathematical or quantified view of nature was clearly affirmed by these thinkers, hence to his treatment of them wc must now turn.
ln the case of Copernicus, our author would draw this conclusion: "He had become convinced that the whole uni verse was made of numbers, hence whatevcr was mathematically truc, was really or astronomically truc. "6 1 t is to be noted that no citations from Copernicus' writings are offered in support of this; instead, two arguments are advanced that in Burtt's mind necessarily lead one to identifying Copernicus' thought with that of Pythagoras'. The first stems from Copernicus' reason for professing his revolutionary heliocentric hypothesis, viz., that su ch a conception "threw the facts of astronomy into a simpler and more harmonious mathematical order."7 Now for Burtt, the only possible justification for this premise is the statement "the universc as a whole, including our earth," is "fundamentally mathematical in its structure". 8 What we have then, is a conditional argument constructed by Burtt, in which Copernicus affirms the consequence, while he (Burtt) goes on to affirm the antecedent, to thereby conclude that this very antecede nt must be Copernicus' position. Yet to so reason is to fall into the fallacy of the consequent. Our author has not shown that if, and on/!' if nature is essentially mathematical, th en one must al ways strive for the more simple mathematical hypothesis. In fact, there definitely exists an alternative antecedent premise to this argument, one to which Ptolemy ascribed, as did Aristotle before him. This arose from the ancients' conception of the middle science of astronomy, wherein the aim was "to save the appearances" in terms of the simplest, mathematical hypothesis. 9 In justifying such a science, it was not necessary to equate nature and mathematics, but merely assume -or better yet recognize -the close proximity between the trajectories of the heavenly bodies and certain geometrical configurations. This assumption was Aristotle 's, JO Ptolemy's, Il and more likely than not, Copernicus', 12 for in ma king it, one is at perfect liberty to heliocentrize the universe if this accounts for the phenomena in a simpler, more efficient manner. And although the theory of Copernicus runs counter to the teachings of the aforementioncd ancients on points of astronomy, it is not thereby necessarily opposed to their position on the relation of mathematics to nature.
The second argument is even weaker. Apparently Copernicus spent several years studying with the Pythagorean Dominicus Maria de Novara, whose influence was a determining factor in the former's world vicw. U lJndoubtcdly it was, but is that sufficient to make the point'l Novara may very weil have bolstered Copernicus' aspirations to discover the simplest mathematical hypothesis, but there is no tcxtual cvidence in Copernicus indicating a wholesale adoption of Novara's Pythagoreanism.
The next thinker to have supposedly accepted the mathematical vicw of nature was Kepler. ln his case, several texts are cited which ostensibly indicate this. Thus, to support his claim that for Kepler, "The real world is a world of quantitative characteristics only: its differences are differences of number alone," Burtt cites the passage: "Wherever there are qualities, there are Iikewise quantities, but not vice versa". To justify his having Kepler say, "quantity is the fundamental feature of things", Burt! quotes his assertion that quantity is "primarium accidens substantiae".14 But neither of these statements arc equivalent to Burtt's interpretation of them; on the contrary, both are mere repetitions of wellknown Aristotelian doctrines -something of which assuredly Kepler was aware. Thus we have every reasoll to think that he conceded their literaI import : to wit, quantity is an accident of physical things. as distinguished from their substance, yet the first and most important accident, being the subject of other accidents su ch as figure, color, etc. Quantity, then, is not the substance or essence of things and, if anything, Burtt's alluding to these passages discloses a fundamental concord between Kepler and Aristotle on this issue, rather than any disagreement. I .,
Nor do other doctrines of Kepler -referred to in Burtt's analysis -attesting 1hat "God was a mathematician", or "perfect knowledge is always mathematical" necessarily suggest an identity between quantity and physical essences. We will have occasion bclow to exhibit the possibility of upholding these, yet ail the while denying the nature-mathematics equivalence.
The third physicist of outstanding repute cited by Burlt as a proponent of the "new metaphysical outlook" is Galileo. Herc potent textual evidencc exists seemingly supporting an identification of mathematics and the nature of the physical world. The famous passages from the" Assayer" are quoted in full, inciuding the "Language of Nature" excerpt, in addition to the one wherein the reality of the proper sensibles, or "secondary qualities", are denied. 
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rence to the Florentine's atomism -i.e., the existence of infinitely smalt, indivisible particles, which in Burtt's view, "possess none but mathematical qualities".17 Let us examine each of these doctrines, to sec if our author's rcading of them is the correct one.
"The Book of nature is written in the Mathematical language, and the symbols are triangles, circles and other geometrical figures, without whose help it is impossible to comprehend a single word of it."I' [t should be notecl at the outset that Galileo's assertion is not an outright equating of the mathematical and the substance of the natural; it is rather a figurative manner of emphasizing the rolc which mathematical entities play in nature. The figure employed is a metaphor, and 10 discern the Florentine's meaning here, the sense of the metaphor must be elaborated. Now without doubt a grasp of the language is imperative for understanding the book, but is the language ail there is, or even what is most essential? [s not the thought, or content of the book, even more retlective of its essence than the language in which it is composed, and cou Id not Galileo have meant this in using the particuJar metaphor which he did? ln this interpretation, mathematics (i.e. quantity) is fundamental to nature, but on no account do the whatnesses of physical things consist in their quantifiable aspects. 19
The negation of the so ca lied secondary qualities does not oppose our reading Galileo in this way. At one point in the Two New Sciences Salviati states: 1 desire, before passing to any other subject, to cali your attention to the fact that these forces, resistances, moments, figures, etc., may be considered either in the abstract, disassociated from matter, or in the concrete, associated with matter. Hencc the properties that be10ng to figures that are merely geometrical and non-material must be moclified when we fill these figures with matter and give them weight. 20 For Galileo, then, what distinguishes the mathematical from the physical, and thus what Îs proper to the latter, Îs "matter" and "weight" -two "concrete" characteristics in sorne way sensible. The secondary qualities may not be as real as the primary one s, yet they must be trusted at least to the extent that these two properly physical qualities can be recognized. In this respect, Galileo's teaching on secondary qualities anticipates Eddington's single, colored-blind eye; granted its reportings are imprecise and subjective -nevertheless they cannot be done away with. 21 In short, this text both qualifies the Florentine's extreme doctrine in the "Assayer", as weil as lends credence to our interpretation outlined above.
Yet what of Galileo's atomism? Burtt's assertion is that they possess none but 17 . BURTT mathematical properties. Galileo himself does not say this, although even if it were true, one need not then conclude that the Florentine ascribed to the further position in question. There is reference to sensible matter being proper to physical things not only in the passage just cited, but elsewhere in his works ; furthermore, there is the neglected connotation of the metaphor eXplained above that points to something more critical in nature than mathematical entities alone: finally, there is Galileo 's deliberate restriction of his method to inorganic phenomena, a restriction that conduces to our interpreting his famous statements as applying to certain parts of the physical world, but not to nature in her totality. è2
Following Burtt's analysis of Galileo come those of Descartes and Hobbes, with which we readily concur: the substance or essence of things is clearly extension for Descartes, and Hobbes unabashedly follows suitY Yet it is consequential to add that neither of these thinkers were physicists, and it is with the physicists that we are concerned. Our principal intent, again, is to reveal a basic unanimity amongst the more important scientists as to the relation between mathematics and nature -a unanimity severed by philosophers of Descartes' persuasion. It is certainly to Burtt's and Koyré's credit to have disclosed the affinities which join Descartes to the scientists discussed thus far; however the identification of their respective positions is what we are forced to deny.
Prior to examining Newton, Burtt briefly discusses the "non-mathematical current", as weil as several less renowned thinkers su ch as Barrow and Boyle, both of whom, he thinks, follow Descartes' assimilation of the real to the mathematical. 24 Barrow was a mathematician and deeply imbued with the very customs that led to Descartes' reduction of matter to extension. Does he, though, acquiesce to the Cartesian view? Certainly Barrow considers geometry the paradigm of the sciences, and physics to be simply applied mathematics ; he even asserts that "quantitative continuity is the object of ail science".25 However, such allegations are not equivalent to saying that only the quantitative exists, or that it alone constitutes the essence of physical phenomena. Failure to make this distinction will of course lead to Burtt's interpretation.
With Boyle, our author writes that he " ... expresses his complete agreement with the mathematical metaphysics of Galileo and Descartes, the whole world seems to be fundamentally mathematical in structure; 'nature does play the mechanician' ; mathematical and mechanical princip les are the 'alphabet in which God wrote the world'''. 26 Once more we have Galileo's metaphor; should it be under-22. There is also Galileo's "positivism", documented by Burtt on pp. 93-94; if the Florentine was unwilling ta grant that the essences of such things as gravit y were rcadily accessible, would he not also, a fortiori, maintain a similar reluctance in regard to the nature of physical reality? This would further account for his particular choice of metaphor in the "Assayer" text cited above. stood in the same way? We wou Id not he so willing to conclude as Burtt does in the case of Boyle; the former admits that Descartes and Hobbes were viewed by the latter as "extremists"2" and that in Boyle's mind, the secondary qualities wcre just as real as the primary ones, His mechanistic tendencies, though, apparently suggest the contrary. Given the absence of consistency in Boyle's writings, perhaps the more prudent course would be to suspend judgement. 28 This leaves us with Newton. Burtt concludes of him:
Just as Boyle, though not a skilled mathematician himself. had accepted without serious question the main structure of the uni verse as portrayed in Galileo, Descartes and Hobbes, 50 Newton ... took over without criticism tht: general view of the physical world and of man's place in it which had developed at the hands of his illustrious predt:cessors. For Newton lOo the world of matter was a world possessing mathematical characteristics fundamentally.29
The reasons for so concluding, as best as we can discern them in Burtt's analysis. are derived from Newton's atomism, a view entailing the reduction of ail physical changes to interactions of particles equipped with the "primary qualities")Il, as weIl as his method -an important aspect of which was the successful use of mathematics.
Concerning the first, Newton is careful to indicate that the qualities proper to the atoms are the very qualities sensed in our common experience. Burtt acknowledges this, but would nonetheless insist that for Newton "the atoms are predominately mathematical". But what is the sense of "mathematical" here? Certainly not the sense that Descartes employed, nor the one supposedly used by Galileo. Extension is only one attribute of the particles, and nowhere do es Newton say il is the predominant one; ail the other attributes may be viewed in quantifiable relations to one another, but they themse1ves are qualities -c.g., hardncss and impenetrability. Or perhaps he is suggesting that in Newton's eyes the quantifiable relations are of tht: essence, such that all of the atomic changes -and thus ail of the changes in nature -are reducible to mathematical laws. Yet this is not what Newton says; the entire Principia may be viewed as an investigation of the mathrmatical principles of natural philosophy" instead of the non-mathematical ones, the two being quite different. lronically enough, Burtt says as much wh en he writes:
For Newton ... the world is what it is; so far as exact mathematicallaws can be discovered in it, weIl and good; so far as not, we must seek to expand our mathematics or rt:sign ourselves to some other less certain method. This i~ obviously the spirit of the paragraph from the preface of the Unless, then, Burtt wishes ta equivocate on "mathematics", we do not see the justification for his uniting Newton 's conceptions with Descartes'; a reduction of this sort is to go further than the texts would allow US. 32 In regard to the second argument, Burtt's very words run counter to his general conclusion. This last, again, would seem to be an embracing (on Newton's part) of a quantified outlook on nature because of the tremendous success rendered by an exclusively mathematical approach. 3J When we turn to the development of the argument, though, where Burtt discusses the effects of the method consequent upon Newton's concept of mass, we read, What about the metaphysical bearings of the Newtonian concept of mass? Did Newton conceive of physical bodies as merely masses, that is, possessing none but geometrical qualities and vis inertiae '1 Probably not. And yet the effect of his work was decidedly to encourage others so to convince them. 14 This is precisely the point that need be emphasized: Newton himself did not subscribe to any identification of mathematics with the substance of nature, but the efficacy of his method and the customs consequent upon it may and did turn the minds of many in this direction. We will have occasion to elaborate on this below ; at this juncture it sufficcs to say that Burtt's train of thought here is indeed weil taken, yet antithetical to his general conclusion rcgarding Newtonian metaphysics.
Further evidence in our favor is Burtt's own assessment of Newton's empiricism. So strong was it that " ... if it were possible to wholly separa te the two aspects of his method, it would have to be said that Newton's ultimate criterion was more empirical than mathematical". JI Thus " ... it is for Newton, in marked contrast with Galileo and Descartes, there is a distinct diffcrcnce between mat hematical truths and physical truths. "36 Such being the case, we would argue to the intrinsic unlikeliness of Newton ever assenting to an interpretation of his works in which the natural is seen to be essentially mathematical.
To sum up our findings thus far: the achievement that is Burtt's in his Mefaphysical Foundations of Modern Science, is a notable one in many respects; yet it does not successfully prove the position of the more influential scientists to be in fact the particular metaphysical foundation which is alleged. We are not suggesting that there were no profound disagreements between the conceptions of these physi-32. The rcason why Burt! alludes ta N ewton's atomism is silllply that this doctrine i, a clear sign for him that the author of the Principia had adopted the panmathelllatislll of his predeecssors. If this is sa. however, how can Burtt maintain that "For Newton there was absolutely no a priori oertainty, sueh as Kepler, Gali1eo and pre-eminently Descartes be1ieved in. that the world is throllgh and through mathematical, still less that its sccrets can be fully unlockcd by the mathematical methods already perfected." ') p. 208. 
Ibid., p. 20g.
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cists and those of the ancients, nor do we wish [0 deny the reality of wha! \vas indeed a Hrevolution in science". Differences there were. but an identification of physical essences with quantity was not one of them. * * * N ow wc must make good our claim to replace Burtt's interpretation with something more faithful. If these scientists were not teaching what our author had supposed on this question, what were they teaching'! An interpretation that would fully recount what the scientists did sav, in addition to accounting for what they only suggested, is as follows: mathcmatical propcrtics, or quantities and quantitative relations, constitute the most desireable objects of the intelligence, for only these provide the objectivity, precision, darity and certitude that the mind always seeks. In brier, the knowledge of such things is the only proper or true knowledgc. Obviously quantities and their relations exist in nature, hence it will be to these that the physicist must tum, as only here -and not in the realm of the qualitative or "occult forms" -will his thirst for such knowledge be assuaged. 1 n consequence, It is not surprising that mathematics was incorporated into physics with such vigour, and with su ch success; one would indeed expect rapid strides forward givcn the extent to which quantity prevails in nature and the zeal with which this aspect of the world was studied. Thus we interpret the statements of the post-Renaissance physicists in [erms of their quest for a certain kind of knowledge, and not in terms of any presupposition regarding the nature of the physical world; in their eyes the mathematical side of reality was para mou nt, not because it comprised the most important part of things, but rather because it was the most important thing to be known.
This outlook of the early physicists (the existence of which is to be defendecl st,,}[tly) is contrasted with a more severe one, that historians often label the" 19 U1 century world view". What characterized this latter was precisely an identification between quantity as the most knowable, and quantity as the on/y knowable thing. The road from the first position to the second was a graduai one, and the earliest traces of it are found in d'Alembert's Preface to the Encyclopédie: L'usage des connaissances mathématiques n'est pas moins grand dans l'examen des corps terrestres qui nous environnent. Toutes les propriétés que nous observons dans ces corps ont entr'elles des rapports plus ou moins sensibles pour nous: la connaissance ou la découverte de ces rapports est presque toujours le seul objet auquel il nous soit permis d'atteindre, et le seul par conséquent que nous devions nous proposer.<7
With time, the now famous doctrine of Lord Kelvin grcw to express the attitude proper to many thinkers of his day:
37. D it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced to the stage of science, whatever the matter may be. 18 This knowable-measurable equivalence was not the only te net of the world picture espoused by these scientists, Historians like Dampier \9, and Singer 40, not to mention a host of contemporary physicists, generalize the attitude of the last century with the phrase "mechanistic-deterministic", suggesting perhaps that Burtt's interpretation of the early scientists is more apropos of these later ones.-I I
The development in attitude between Newton's day and Kelvin's is not difficult to explain. Physicists and philosophers alike, inured 10 the methods of science and intoxicated by its awesome explanatory-predictive power, grew ta construe the object of science as the exclusive object of the mind. This was most of al! the case with those thinkers whose formation was almost exclusively mathematical and who had little real contact with nature. Notice, then, that the resulting 19 th century outiook -one still very much alive today -reflected precisely the effects of custom, and not the actual position of the more prestigious physicists. The next order of business is to return to these same thinkers and brief1y justify our aforesaid interpretation of them.
Copernicus, we recall, was "highly inf1uenced" by Pythagoreans such as Nicholas of Cusa, Giordano Bruno, and the above-mentioned Novara. We also recal! that no textual evidence is found in Copernicus indicating an adoption of authentic Pythagoreanism. Nonetheless, there undoubtedly was an inf1uence exerted by these men, as Burtt insisted, which justifies our asking in what it consisted. Our author is careful to emphasize that for these thinkers "knowledge is al ways measurement", and more generaIly, "ail certain knowledge that is possible for man must be mathematical knowledge".42 Sentiments of this kind are definitely implied in Copernicus' writings, suggesting that the inf1uence exerted was an induced enthraliment with the cogency, simplicity and beauty of mathematical explanations. 43 On this hypothesis, his adamant defence of heliocentricity for mathematical reasons is perfectly explicable, and in no way discordant with the traditiünal understanding of astronomy.
The case of Kepler is even clearer. The texts cited by Burtt to manifest his supposed equating of quantity with the "fundamental structure of the universe" 
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can be far better understood in Iight of our interpretation. Kepler's remarks stressing that quantity is closer ta substance than quality plainly reveal his view that the first of these is more stable, more permanent than the second. This in tum supports his further inference, ..... that nothing can be known completely except quantities or by quantities, and 50 it happens that the conclusions of mathematics are more certain and indubitable." Even more cJearly, "Just as the eye was made to see colors, and the ear 10 hear sounds, 50 the human mind was made to understand, not whatever you please, but quantity. "44 Thus Bunt states with justification, "Quantitative features (for Kepler) are the sole features of things as far as the world of our knowledge is concerned."45 But, as we have repeatedly argued, Burtt's proceeding from this to the following conclusion is unwarranted: "Therefore, quantity is the fundamental feature of things".4" The Erst is dcfinitely present in Kepler's words, while the second is not.
With Galileo, the sundry positions found in his writings (and referred 10 above) can ail be aecounted for in terms of his having held that mathematical knowledge is the most perfect knowJedge, and thus the most important. Obviously, one adhering to such a position will strive whenever possible to explain and reduee the workings of nature to quantitative analyses, in the form of geometrical demonstrations and meehanical laws -something which in fact Galileo did. That he should tum to a mathematieal atomism, and a rejeetion of the "secondary qualities" is not surprising. Thus mathematics is indeed the key to understanding nature's secrets, with "key" meaning: that in virtue of which the mind ean have the most perfect knowledge of the physical world -though not in its entirety. The Florentine, let us repeat once more, is not asserting that nature is in essence mathematical; on the contrary, in his seheme (identieal to Kepler's and Newton's) a mathematical approaeh enables us to know certain aspects of nature (i.e., her geometrical "letters") in an exact, certain way. In short, the importance of mathematies is the certitude it offers coneerning a part of the physical world, and not a grasp of that world in its essence nor in its totality.
This very distinction is suggested in a passage from his Dialogue on the two chief world systems:
Extensively, that is, with regard to the multitude of intelligibles, which are infinite, the human understanding is as nothing even if it understands a thousand propositions ... But taking man's understanding intensively, in so far as this term denotes understanding sorne propositions perfectly, 1 say that the human intellect does understand some of them perfectly and thus in these it has as mueh absolute certainty as nature itself has. Of sueh are the mathematical sciences alone; that is, geometry and arithmetic, in which the divine intellect indeed knows infinitely more propositions sinee it knows al!. But with 44 . BURTT regard to those few which the human intellect does understand, 1 believe that its knowledge equals the divine in objective certainty, for here it succeeds in understanding necessity, beyond which there can be no greater sureness. 47 The strength of this passage and others 4S indicates our position: Galileo seeks mathematical explanations not because they reveal nature in her essence, but rather because they en able him to participa te in the certitude of the Divinity Himse\f.
The same may equally be said of Barrow and, to a lesser extent, of Boyle. 49 Nonetheless the latter admits that mathematical principles, given their certitude and c1arity, "must be ultimate truths superior to God himself." Furthermore, they are (along with metaphysical principles) the "universal foundations and instruments of ail the knowledge we mortals can acquire". Thus Boyle's "mathematical view of nature" can very weil be construed as a simple concession that the quantitative aspects of things provide us with the most perfect kind of knowledge.
Lastly, and most importantly, we turn to Newton: did he, in fact, maintain this position and not the one attributed to him by Burtt? Again, on the basis of his texts alone we would have to say yeso In the Principia he writes:
Our purpose is only to trace out the quantity and properties of this force (attraction) from the phenomena and to apply what we discover in some simple cases, as principles, by which, in a mathematical way, we may estimate the effects thereof in more involved cases ... We said 'in a mathematical way', to avoid a1l questions about the nature or quality of this force, which we would not be understood to determine by any hypothesis. 50 Here he explicitly acknowledges the restricted character of his enterprise, in as much as the "natures", "qualities" or ultimate causes lie simply beyond its bounds. s, What the use of mathematics does give is a clear, rigorous and certain explanation, as witness its ability to predict and control phenomena. As in the case of his predecessors, mathematics for Newton is desireable for the knowledge it gives usnot because it is intimate\y entwined with the essence of nature. In fact, this last assertion would be tantamount to the particular kind of hypothesis he was al ways careful to avoid. 52 Burtt's emphasis on Newton's restricting himself to the "how" of things further supports this. In one pertinent passage. he makes the very point which we intend:
For Newton, then, science was composed of laws stating the mathematical behavior of nature solely -laws clearly dcducible l'rom phenomena and exactly verifiable in phenomena -everything l"urthcr is to be swept out of ~cienee, which thus becomes a body of absolutely certain truth about the doings of the physical world. 51 The further inferences, we repeat, to the effect that this "mathematical behavior" is the only behavior, or the only knowable one, are not to be found in Newton, nor must they be assumed in order to explain what he does say. On the contrary. the summation given by Burtt here is ail one need say; it stresses the key role of mathcmatics in our knowledge, and not its role in things.
Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief
To summarize thus far. the "heart of the new scientific metaphysics" is not what Burtt and others would have us believe. A new out look there certainly was. but it did not consist in the reduction of nature to mathematics. As we have laboured to show with the above analysis, it seems best to understand the attitude of post-Renaissance science to consist in a renunciation of the study of natural qualities -the approach of the ancient physicists, by and large, -and an embracing of ail investigations into natural quantities. The reason being that the knowledge of quantity is the most perfect knowledge accessible to inquiring man, and hence the most desireable. In consequence, it was only a matter of lime befme physics became mathematical, that is, the exact science of physical quantities; in Kelvin's terminology, physics was heretofore the science of the measureable.
* * *
The question now ta be faced is in regard ta the views of relativity and quantum physicists. Would they subscribe to the doctrine of their "dassical" precursors as we have interpreted it? Are the mathematical features of nature the most important, indeed, the sole objects of knowledge (to follow the 19 th century outlook) for thinkers such as Einstein, Bohr, Planck, Heisenberg and the like? Our daim is that there is partial agreement, but equally substantial disagreement. Let us begin with the similarities.
For sure, the quantitative, or the measureable, is the proper subject of physics equally for current scientists as for dassical. It is ais a true for modern science that the measureable is not ail that exists, nor is it most essential to the physical world. Eddington makes the first point when writing "1 should Iike to make it c1ear that the limitation of the scope of physics ta pointer readings and the like is not a philosophical craze of my own but is essentially the current scientific doctrine. ";4 And Heisenberg attests:
This general tendency of the new science also foreshadows a characteristic feature that has often been discussed, namely the emphasis on the quantitative. The demand for precise experimental conditions, accu rate measurements, an exact unambiguous terminology and a mathematical presentation of the idealized phenomena has determined the aspect of this science of nature, and brought il the name of "exact science".55
Whereas classical physicists lent themselves to mis-interpretation concerning the measureable or quantitative not being equivalent to the essence of the real, scientists of this century are outspokenly unambiguous. To cite Eddington once more:
Scientific investigation does not lead to knowledge of the intrinsic nature of things. Whenever we state the properties of a body in terms of physical quantities we are imparting knowledge as to the response of various metrical indicators to its presence, and nothing more. 56
Heisenberg also insists on this in a passage where he comments on the work of Heinrich Hertz:
..... here it emerges clearly how physics began to remember once more that a natural science is one who se propositions on limited domains of nature can have only a correspondingly limited validity; and that science is not a philosophy developing a world view of nature as a whole or about the essence of things. 57
In the sa me work the author concedes that "this modesty was largely lost during the nineteenth century", 58 when, as we indicated earlier, many grew to consider physics as having a greater power and scope than it actually did have. Heisenberg insists, though, that a proc1ivity of this kind is antithetical to science: "The philosophic content of a science is only preserved if science is conscious of its limits". 59
The third point of agreement between the two is the acknowledgment that the mathematical approach is the most objective, precise and clear -at least for those initiated ta its language. Indeed, this is precisely what sustains physics in its role of paradigm, or model, for the other sciences Y' At this point the unanimity ceases, and significant differences arise. We noticed with the classical physicists a tendency ta view the non-quantifiable as insignificant, and even unknowable for thinkers of Kelvin's persuasion. Accordingly, sciences such as biology were hardly worth the effort, or their subjects viewed as unknowable, unless, of course, they could employ mathematics and reduce the living to the measureable. Now such efforts of reduction were attempted in the last century, and 61 Granted the objectivity and precision -the "clarity" as Einstein would say -are not present with organic phenomena to the same degree .1' the inorganic, this does not and should not prevent scientists l'rom pursuing the study of life. Knowledge of non-mathematical kind abounds in this realm. and it is both lcgitimate and fruitful; for according to Bohr and Heisenberg, it i5 complementary with the knowledge acquired in mathematical physics. Bohr. for exarnple. writes:
Owing to this essential feature of complementarity, the concept of purpose. which is foreign to mechanical analysis, finds a certain field of application in biology. Indeed, in this sense, teleological argumentation may be regarded as a legitimate feature of physiological description which takes due regard to the characteristics of life in a way analogous to the recognition of the quantum of action in the correspondance argument of atomic physics. 6 :
Thus for these physicists 6J the knowable is not restricted to the measureable; iD fact, investigations of the non-measureable are both legitimate and fruitful.
They are also objective and certain -a further daim which dassical physicists would undoubtedly deny. Here again, it is in the realm of the living that this i5 most c1early disclosed. Bohr considers the existence of life an elementary fact, which is as important to biology as the quantum of action is to atomic physics. 6 • Secondly, Planck and Eddington bear witness to one's internaI experience of freedom and responsibility. This experience, they maintain, is certain, Immediate and objective, but obviously not measureable, nor subject to mathematical laws 65 ln discussing the points of disagreement between classical and modern physicists, we have heretofore exhibited the latter's inclination to uphold the worthwhileness of studying the non-measureable. We must now ask whether the same physicists wou Id grant the legitimacy of an approach that investigated the measureable without recourse to measurement. 1 n others words, do twentieth cent ury scientists sever themselves from their predecessors even more strongly by allowing for a successful non-mathematical approach to inorganic phcnomena -one that would concentrate on physical qualities rather than quantities alone?
To make such an allowance would fly in the face of Newton and Galileo; nevertheless, several scientists of this era have done so. To see how, it behooves us to set forth Heisenberg's remarks on the researches of Goethe in the sphere of color. The poet's scientific method is described in these words:
For Goethe, ail observation and understanding of nature began with the immediate sensory impression; not, therefore, with an isolated phenomenon, filtered out with instruments and so to speak wrung from nature, but with the free natural happening, directly accessible to our senses. h6
Heisenberg goes on to add that in other respects, Goethe's method (and conclusions) closely resembled that of Newton's: th us the former assuredly leaned on a kind of experimentation, and developed theories to the same extent as the latter. 67 But the distinguishing feature, to repeat, was the absence of measurement and mathematics. Does Heisenberg concede any value to Goethe-type efforts? In response, here are his very words:
Dividing reality in this way into different aspects immediately resolves the contradiction between Goethe's and Newton's theories of color. In the great structure of science, the two theories take up different positions. It is certain that an acceptance of modern physics cannot prevent the scientist from following Goethe's way of contemplating nature toO.6~
If we follow correctly, only a combination of the mathematical and non-mat hematical avenues will produce an understanding of the physical world in its entirety, which is to say that the quantitative and the qualitative aspects of things must bath be regarded in the total study of nature.
This same point is implicitly made in Heisenberg's (and others) insistence on the physicists constant recourse to "ordinary language".69 This language, argues Heisenberg, signifies concepts which are derived from an immediate connection with reality. They consequently represent the real more faithfully than the mathematical idealizations of physics, and thus "seem to be more stable in the expansion of knowledge than the precise ter ms of scientific language".)O If science hopes to secure stability, as weil as remain in contact with the concrete physical world it attempts to explain, then the kind of concepts signified by plain language must never be abandoned. This reveals again the basic insufficiency of a physics exclu sively tied to mathematics, and emphasizes the necessity of complementing the mathematical approach with that of the qualitative, or non-mathematical.
At this point it is opportune to make known the similarities which tie together the positions of Heisenberg and Bohr in this regard with those of a multitude of scientists stemming as far back as antiquity. The poet-physicist Goethe is one quantity is not "ail there is" to the physical world. nor even what constitutes its essence, then a qualitative study of nature becomes just as important as a mathematical or quantitative one. Such an approach was conducted by Aristotle in his PhysÎcs, Gilbert in his De Magnate and Goethe in his Zur Farbenlehre, and as Heisenberg puts it, mathematical physics is obligated to make room for these kinds of endeavours. for only in virtue of them will physical science ever achieve a knowledge of nature in her totality.
